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have argued that marketing gathers more notoriety, because unlike other functions such as accounting, finance, or operations, marketing performs a
boundary-spanning role for the organization and
is therefore more likely to be exposed to environmental pressures to deviate (Ferrell and Gresham,
1985). These pressures could emanate from suppliers, competitors, and shifting consumer tastes,
among other sources. While firms may not have
any sizeable influence on these external pressures,
they can, however, shape the environment of the
marketing function to empower executives with
greater ethical sensitivity.
By and large, ethical decision making by the
marketing team is influenced by three types of
factors: individual characteristics, organizational
characteristics, and environmental factors (Leigh
and Murphy, 1999). Scholars have used a variety of
theoretical frameworks to address these factors, including: frameworks based on moral philosophies
(Laczniak and Murphy, 1991), contingency models of ethical behavior (Ferrell and Gresham, 1985),
models based on individual deontological and teleological evaluations (Hunt and Vitell, 1986), examinations of cross-cultural influences (Giacobbe and
Segal, 2000), analyses of the nature of the decision
situation (Lund, 2000), and the integration of ethics into marketing strategy (Robin and Reidenbach,
1987), among others. All these approaches have
made significant contributions to the discussion on
ethics in marketing; however, examination of organizational characteristics necessitates further research attention, as these are the only factors that
are truly under the control of the firm’s top-management team (Ferrell and Gresham, 1985; Leigh
and Murphy, 1999; Vardi, 2001; Vardi and Wiener,
1996).

Abstract
The theoretical notion of anomie is used to examine the
impact of top management’s control mechanisms on the
environment of the marketing function. Based on a literature review and in-depth field interviews with marketing managers in diverse industries, a conceptual model
is proposed that incorporates the two managerial control mechanisms, viz. output and process control, and relates their distinctive influence to anomie in the marketing function. Three contingency variables, i.e., resource
scarcity, power, and ethics codification, are proposed to
moderate the relationship between control mechanisms
and anomie. The authors also argue for the link between
anomic environments and the propensity of unethical
marketing practices to occur. Theoretical and managerial implications of the proposed conceptual model are
discussed.
Keywords: anomie, ethics codification, control mechanisms, marketing function, normlessness, output control, power, process control, resource scarcity

Introduction
Of all the divisions in a business organization, the marketing function is the one most often
charged with harboring unethical practices (Akaah
and Riordan, 1990; Baumhart, 1961; Brenner and
Molander, 1977; Tsalikis and Fritzsche, 1989). Past
research has examined a variety of avenues in the
practice of marketing where questionable ethical behavior may occur. For instance, ethical questions have been raised in market research (Hunt
et al., 1984; Nantel and Weeks, 1996; Tybout and
Zaltman, 1974), salesforce supervision (Hunt and
Vasquez-Parraga, 1993), pricing management
(Nantel and Weeks, 1996), target marketing (Smith
and Cooper-Martin, 1997), and product and service
management (Nantel and Weeks, 1996).1 Scholars
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The fundamental question for a firm’s senior
management remains: how to avoid creating conditions in the marketing function that could lead to
ethical transgressions? Scholars and practitioners
have answered this in myriad ways. Some have
recommended formal corporate policies and codes
of conduct (Murphy, 1995), while others have argued that marketing’s strategic planning process
should integrate ethical values from the very inception (Robin and Reidenbach, 1987). We argue that,
in addition to these recommendations, one needs
to address the root causes that may create an environment ripe for unethical practices in the marketing function. We, therefore, propose that a crucial piece of the ethics puzzle lies in understanding
how the top management chooses to control the
marketing function and in examining the unintended ramifications of the chosen control mechanism. We synthesize our review of the literature
with multiple field interviews of marketing managers from diverse industries to conceptualize a
contingency model. In the contingency model, we
examine the potential effects of two of the most
commonly used control mechanisms, viz. output
and process control (Jaworski, 1988) on the environment of the marketing function. To describe the
environment of the marketing function, we use the
theory of anomie (Merton, 1964, 1968). Anomie is
a situational condition characterized by normlessness and social disequilibrium that sets the stage
for deviant behavior. In addition, we examine the
impact of three moderating factors, resource scarcity, power, and ethicscodification,onthecontrolmechanism-anomie relationship.
We make multiple contributions to the academic
literature and managerial practice. First, we address anomie in marketing at the functional silo
level, moving the discussion beyond its earlier applications in sales management. Second, we use a
sociological approach to anomie that analyzes the
environment of the marketing function at a structural level. This is a distinctly different approach
from previous examinations that utilized the psychological notion of anomie and targeted the individual level. Third, we identify and conceptualize
the dynamics of top-management control of marketing as a critical antecedent to the creation of
anomie. Finally, we identify conditions that could
exacerbate or abate the control-mechanism-anomie
relationship. In terms of implications for practice,
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we argue that scrutinizing the marketing function
through the anomie lens can help firms understand
the nature of the environment that causes the proliferation of unethical marketing practices. Armed
with such an understanding, managers can then
work to minimize anomie and therefore reduce the
chances of ethical transgressions.
In the following sections, we first provide an
overview of ethically questionable practices in marketing followed by a description of our data collection. Second, we introduce the theoretical notion of
anomie and demonstrate the appropriateness for its
applicability to the context of a marketing function.
Third, we discuss control mechanisms and present
our propositions on the effects of output and process control on anomie in the marketing function;
further propositions are argued with contingency
variables as moderators. In the final sections of the
article, we offer a discussion of the theoretical and
managerial implications of our work.
Ethics and the marketing function
While there is no universal guideline for what
constitutes ethical conduct in marketing practice
(Ferrell and Gresham, 1985), there is an understated
expectation that responsible marketing should not
intentionally violate social contracts or cause harm
to any of the parties involved. We, therefore, define
unethical marketing practices as intentional decisions and actions that violate social contracts with,
and result in harm to, internal or external constituents of the marketing function (Cohen, 1993; Hunt
et al., 1989). For instance, misrepresenting products, services, and information (Hunt et al., 1984);
promoting unneeded products and services (Blankenship, 1964; Hunt and Vasquez-Parraga, 1993);
or offering financial inducements to secure an advantaged position (Blankenship, 1964) would all
constitute ethically questionable practices.
Marketing executives often get their cues on ethical standards from the environment of the marketing function. Past research has addressed the issue
of ethics and organizational environment (Bommer
et al., 1987; Jones, 1991; Trevino et al., 1998) and has
underscored the fact that the corporate context is a
critical determinant of the ethical standards of marketing managers (Leigh and Murphy, 1999; Robin
and Reidenbach, 1987). Additionally, research
shows that organizational sub-units construct their
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own values and norms that are distinct from that of
the larger organization (Vardi, 2001). Consequently
individuals within a department or function may
refer to the sub-unit’s value system for behavioral
cues and direction (Schein, 1984). Thus marketing
as a sub-unit may have its own idiosyncratic culture, norms, and predominant values (Schneider
and Rentsch, 1988). This environment of the marketing function is a crucial piece of the ethics puzzle, because it provides the setting for either abating or fostering ethically questionable practices
(Leigh and Murphy, 1999).
While various theoretical approaches have been
used in the past to capture the environment of a
sub-unit, e.g., culture (“patterns of shared values
and beliefs”; Deshpande and Webster, 1989, p. 4) or
climate (“member’s perceptions about the extent to
which the organization is currently fulfilling their
expectations”; Deshpande and Webster, 1989, p.
5), our approach here is to utilize a theoretical lens
that captures the sociological underpinnings of unethical behavior. We therefore use the theoretical
notion of anomie (Durkheim, [1897]/1951; Merton,
1968) to describe the environment of the marketing
function and to examine this environment’s intervening role between the choice of control mechanisms and the resulting unethical practices in marketing decision making.
Data collection and analysis
Given our aim of bringing conceptual understanding to a phenomenon, we employ a pragmatic and pluralistic research approach (Creswell
and Plano Clark, 2007), rather than a purely positivistic or interpretive one. Specifically, our approach utilizes two methods to develop conceptual
understanding—a literature review and qualitative research through in-depth interviews. This approach has been found to be useful in other contexts for examining the marketing function (Kohli
and Jaworski, 1990; Workman et al., 1998). Specifically, it allows us to synthesize our qualitative
findings with past research and theory. Through
the combined use of qualitative data and the literature, we present propositions and arguments for
the same. In addition, the pluralistic design provides us with a means to reconstruct theory (Burawoy, 1991) and capture the dynamic nature of the
anomie phenomenon.
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Our qualitative interviews were semi-structured and composed entirely of open-ended questions, with the intent of allowing the participants
to expand and explain their thoughts and experiences. The length of the interviews ranged from
approximately 30 min to an hour and a half. Purposeful sampling was utilized (Creswell and
Plano Clark, 2007) and resulted in six individual
interviews. The respondents were senior-level
marketing officials, with titles ranging from Vice
President-Marketing to Brand Manager, and employed in diverse industries (Software, Pharma,
Consumer Goods, etc.). On average, the respondents possessed 11 years of work experience and
were evenly split on gender (3 males and 3 females). The interviews were initially taped, and
later transcribed and analyzed in the phenomenological tradition (Moustakas, 1994). This process consists of bracketing personal experiences;
coding the database; developing significant statements; grouping together the statements into
meaning units, themes, and premises.
Anomie and the marketing function
The theory of anomie provides a useful theoretical framework to examine unethical behavior from
a sociological and/or a psychological perspective.
In this paper, we utilize Robert Merton’s original theory of social structure and anomie (Merton,
1964). This theory provides a useful lens to address
the conditions that may lead a marketing function
toward unethical marketing practices. In this theory, anomie is defined as a condition of “normlessness or social disequilibrium where the rules once
governing conduct have lost their savor or force”
(Merton, 1964, p. 226).
While the thrust of our argument advocates the
value of using Merton’s theory of anomie to describe the marketing function’s internal environment, we also believe it is necessary to outline
the distinctions between the sociological and psychological examinations of anomie. Attention to
these distinctions is necessary as scholars have
noted that two sources of confusion often surround the study of anomie: (a) a misunderstanding exists in the differences between Merton’s
theory of anomie and Merton’s theory of strain
(Featherstone and Deflem, 2003) and, (b) a blurring of lines has evolved between Merton’s strain
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Figure 1. A model of antecedents and consequences of anomie in the marketing function.

theory and the characterization of anomy or anomia in the psychology literature (Orru, 1987). As
these distinctions are central to understanding
our contributions to the ethics and marketing literature, we now delineate them (Figure 1). The
sociological stream of anomie is most often credited to Durkheim ([1897]/1951). Taking a sociological and structural perspective, Durkheim’s
([1897]/1951) work focused on the link between
environmental conditions or social causes and the
patterns of deviant acts such as crime or suicide.
Durkheim ([1897]/1951) purported that human
nature was relatively invariant; hence, the social
environment provided greater explanatory power
of behavior than a psychological understanding
of it.
Merton (1964, 1968) built upon Durkheim’s work
in an effort to explain how the rates of deviant behavior may vary in different social structures. Merton (1968) developed a systematic framework that
outlined two structures to analyze a social system,
a cultural structure and a social structure. Merton
(1968) argued that the two structural conditions
influence individual behavioral processes and interactions within the social institution. The first
attribute, the cultural structure, comprises two elements—the goals communicated by the social institution and the institutionalized norms and procedures that provide direction in attaining such goals
(Merton, 1968). The second, the social structure, focuses on the various relationships that individuals
are inherently involved in within any group or society (Merton, 1968).

Using these two structures as a framework to examine social systems, Merton (1968) outlined two
theories. Merton’s first theory, the theory of anomie, primarily uses the cultural structure (i.e., the
universal goals and the normative means to attain the goals) to examine a social system. When
the goals emphasized by an institution’s culture
are prioritized over the standard, accepted procedures to reach the goals, a disjuncture or imbalance
occurs within the cultural structure. Merton (1968)
purported the environment resulting from this disjuncture is best described as anomie, or an atmosphere ripe with normlessness and disregard for
normative rules and procedures. The conditions
of anomie would be further enhanced when these
normative procedures are effectively disregarded
to reach the culturally approved goal (Merton,
1968). Merton (1968) suggested this form of anomie occurs within the U.S. society when the cultural values of materialism and monetary success
outweigh the normative procedures to attain such
goals. Hence, Merton’s theory is notable for two
reasons. First it is an aggregate-level analysis of a
social system (Baumer, 2007). Second, it uses these
aggregate level structures to help in describing the
variation in rates of deviation across collectivities,
such as groups, departments, firms, and societies
(Baumer, 2007).
Merton’s second theory, the theory of strain, is
often confused or intermingled with his theory of
anomie. However, sociology scholars maintain that
each theory is distinct (Baumer, 2007; Featherstone
and Deflem, 2003). Unlike Merton’s (1968) theory
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of anomie, the theory of strain incorporates both
the cultural and social structures of a social system. Its goal is to explain the pressures that propel
an individual toward using illegitimate means to
attain cultural goals. According to Merton (1968),
when the cultural and social structures are not in
equilibrium, the individual feels a strain. For instance, an individual may feel strain in American
society when the cultural goals, such as material
success, are uniformly applied and generally accepted by everyone in society; however, the social
structure, such as the class structure, does not uniformly distribute the means to attain these goals
(Messner, 2003).
When faced by an impediment toward goal
achievement, the individual feels a sense of frustration (Berkowitz, 1962), dissatisfaction, and pressure (Agnew et al., 1996). In society, this frustration may result when one’s achieved status or class
falls short of the culture’s ascribed status or class
(Jackson and Burke, 1965; Stinchcombe, 1964). In
a business context, frustration and dissatisfaction
may result when an individual or department pursues corporate objectives, but does not have access
to the necessary financial, temporal, or human resources to attain the goal (Poveda, 1994). Hence,
the notion of frustration, negative affect, and dissatisfaction is central to Merton’s and others’ theories of strain (Agnew et al., 1996; Cloward and
Ohlin, 1960). However, it should be noted that frustration and dissatisfaction do not erratically or immediately occur. Instead, frustration often occurs
in an incremental, evolutionary manner and the response of others within the social environment is a
critical element in this process (Cohen, 1965).
To manage the pressure and frustration created
by the environment, the individual may choose
among five distinct responses or social roles, including roles that would motivate the individual
to act in a deviant manner (Merton, 1968). These
social roles are based on the acceptance of, rejection of or substitution of the current cultural goals
and institutionalized means (Merton, 1968). These
adaptations include the acceptance of means and
goals (e.g., conformity), the acceptance of goals and
rejection of means (e.g., innovation), the rejection
of goals and an acceptance of means (e.g., ritualism), the rejection of both goals and means (e.g., retreatism), or a complete replacement of goals and
means (e.g., rebellion) (Merton, 1968).
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Summarily, the theory of strain provides a structural explanation of the processes that link a situation (i.e., goal impediment created by a structural
imbalance) with one’s motivation to act (i.e., commit an act of deviance) (Baumer, 2007; Featherstone
and Deflem, 2003). At a broad level, this situationindividual approach resembles the framework
widely used in social psychology. The commonality in framework may also explain the co-mingling
of theories and vocabulary that has evolved between (a) Merton’s (1968) structural theory of strain
and (b) individual-level approaches in psychology,
such as anomy and anomia, that describe an individual’s “social malintegration” (Srole, 1956, p.
712) and “the breakdown of the individual’s sense
of attachment to society” (MacIver, 1950, p. 84) due
to an imbalance within a social system (Orru, 1987).
In addition, scholars have mixed the sociological
and psychological theories over the years. For instance, Hirschi’s Causes for Delinquency gradually
altered strain theory from a structural-level analysis toward a more individual-level analysis (Burton Jr. and Cullen, 1992), and researchers have further blurred the distinction by referring to anomie
and anomia interchangeably in studies of deviance
including that of white-collar crime (Krause, 2002;
Poveda, 1994).
The shift away from sociology’s “structural determinants of anomie toward the effects of a psychological conditions on other individual attitudes
and condition” (Orru, 1987, p. 127) was also propelled by works in psychology by MacIver (1950)
and Srole (1956). The psychological stream of anomie, called anomy (MacIver, 1950) or anomia
(Srole, 1956), is squarely situated as an analysis
conducted at the individual level. One need only
examine MacIver’s definition of anomy, “the breakdown of the individual’s sense of attachment to society” (p. 84), or Srole’s (1956) instrument that measures anomia, the “self-to-other alienation” (p. 711),
to understand psychological approaches are based
on individual rather than structural-level analyses.
In related research, empirical studies of anomie
within marketing, ethics, and management have
been conducted at the individual level of analysis
by using the Srole scale of anomia or a similar individual-level measurement instrument. These studies have examined abuses of retail-return policies
by consumers (Rosenbaum and Kuntze, 2003), reactions to customer fraud by store employees (Ca-
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ruana et al., 2001), actions such as cheating by undergraduate business school students (Caruana et
al., 2000, 2001), and assessments of anomia inside
and outside the workplace (Tsahuridu, 2006).
In contrast to the individual-level approach used
by previous studies, our approach to examining
anomie is different. Specifically, we return to anomie’s sociological origins and use Merton’s (1968)
theory of anomie to conceive of an analysis at the
structural level. This structural-level theory (Burton Jr. and Cullen, 1992) provides a unique theoretical basis for understanding social systems, such
as organizations and marketing departments, that
possess a distinct culture of their own (Deshpande
and Webster, 1989; Ghoshal and Moran, 1996)
which transmits goals and sets normative standards to attain these goals. The structural approach
provided by the theory of anomie has been reaffirmed by scholars who suggest it “remains a valuable perspective for the study of deviance in society.” (Featherstone and Deflem, 2003, p. 485) This
approach is also noteworthy in three final respects.
First, it adds to the paucity of research on anomie
that has been noted by scholars within management (Caruana et al., 2001), organizations (Tsahuridu, 2006), and marketing (Rosenbaum and Kuntze, 2003). Second, our approach is applied to a
unique milieu. Whereas previous discussions have
focused on retail-sales settings (Caruana et al.,
2001), undergraduate business schools (Caruana et
al., 2000, 2001), and workplaces in general (Tsahuridu, 2006), we examine the hub of marketing activity, the marketing department. Finally, this approach builds upon previous research on anomie.
This examination studies anomie within a functional department, thereby heeding Tsahuridu’s
(2006) call for anomie research aimed at “different
organizational levels” (p. 171), and also meeting
Caruana et al.’s (2001) recommendation that future
research efforts study additional relationships that
potentially explain a greater amount of the variance associated with anomie.
There are multiple reasons why the notion of
anomie is particularly well suited for studying ethics in the marketing function. First, the theory’s unit
of analysis is a collective, which is applicable to the
organization and an organizational sub-unit. Second, the theory explains the impact of social structure on behavior. Thus, anomie provides a means
to characterize the social structure of an organiza-
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tion and predict an environment that influences
potential behavior. Finally, the theory represents
anomie as a dynamic state or condition, which allows us to understand a variety of deviant behaviors. We now explicate these three reasons to demonstrate the suitability of the theory to our context.
(1) The unit of analysis. Given anomie’s origins in
sociology, its unit of analysis focuses on the
collective and not the individual. Specifically, the theoretical notion of anomie was
propounded to analyze the patterns of relationships and behaviors within social units
and institutions. This collective perspective has allowed researchers to apply the
theory to a range of social units, including
the American society (Merton, 1968; Messner and Rosenfeld, 1997), various organizational contexts (Cohen, 1995), cohorts
within a population (Lee and Bartkowski,
2004), corporate mergers and acquisitions
(Mansfield, 2004), and communities (Fullilove et al., 1998).
(2) Impact of social structure on behavior. Organizations manage their structural conditions
through various control mechanisms that
define organizational goals and monitor behavioral progress toward the emphasized
goals (Ouchi, 1977). These control mechanisms create a pervasive environment
that impacts multiple aspects of organizational life including behavior (Cohen, 1995).
The theory of anomie provides a means to
identify distinct structural conditions under such control mechanisms, the environment formed from the combination of these
structural conditions, and the behavior resulting from such an environment. Thus, it
serves as a valuable guide in defining the
structural circumstances that may lead to
deviant behaviors within the organization’s
sub-units (Cohen, 1995).
(3) Explanatory power. The theory also provides a
means to explain a wide range of unethical
marketing practices. Merton’s (1968) representation of anomie as a state or a condition
is intrinsically dynamic, i.e., anomie is influenced by its immediate context, and can
change or even reverse (Smith, 1998). This
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dynamic nature allows the theory to explain a wide range of behaviors under high
or low levels of anomie, by examining the
equilibrium between institutionalized goals
and means.
Anomie and ethics in marketing
We suggest that unethical marketing practices gain a fertile ground when economic goals,
such as profit, market share, earnings per share,
or stock price, are overwhelmingly prioritized, or
when the communicated and accepted goals are
simply unattainable under the prevalent conditions or resources within the marketing function.
Specifically, a disjuncture occurs between the social system’s goals and the means to attain these
goals. Under such conditions the marketing function is faced with structural characteristics that
are in imbalance. This imbalance creates a departmental environment that can be characterized as
anomic.
Merton (1968) purports that under anomic conditions, the frequency of departures from accepted
norms increases. This is largely because anomie
promotes an environment in which the firm’s prescribed goals are placed ahead of the normative
means to achieve them (Cohen, 1993). When operating in this environment, decision makers in the
marketing function may begin to disregard standards of legitimate marketing practice (as they observe others in marketing do the same), and in a
zeal to capture the market at any cost, may simply
lose their drive to act ethically (Cohen, 1993). The
slippery slope from anomic environment to unethical marketing practices was described by a number of our respondents. They were not only cognizant of such an environment, but also aware of its
outcome:
people are ... the product of their environment.
So if they’re observing, particular patterns of
behavior or see things going on, then they are
more inclined to say, ‘that must be acceptable
here, and now I’ve got an opportunity to’, or..
‘that must mean that it’s okay if I do this stuff’.
And so they start to cut corners, and they start
to make these bad decisions, and they’re basically, replicating what they’ve seen.
–Vice President, Medical Technology and
Equipment
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The marketing landscape is replete with instances of such consequences. From the brand manager’s internal push of a premeditated and predetermined market research study to gain a higher
budget, to misrepresenting products, services, and
information to clients (Hunt et al., 1984); to slipping
new products past federal inspections (Cohen,
1993)—as the marketing function’s environment
becomes more anomic, the propensity for unethical
marketing practices increases. Thus, we propose:
P1: A positive relationship exists between the level
of anomie in the marketing function and the
likelihood of unethical marketing practices to
occur.
The level of anomie in the marketing function
could be affected by many factors. We argue that
it is particularly influenced by how the top management chooses to control the marketing function. One of the key decisions taken by a firm’s topmanagement team is to settle on how the various
functional sub-units will be controlled. By selecting a particular way to control each functional subunit, the top management communicates, both explicitly and implicitly, the goals, means, rewards,
and punishments that come with the territory. It is,
therefore, critical to examine the impact that control mechanisms have on the extent of anomie in
the marketing function.
Control of the marketing function
Of all the functional silos in a firm, marketing is
perhaps the most closely watched and scrutinized
function by the top management (Kumar, 2004).
There are multiple reasons for this. First, marketing
is the primary engine of financial growth for the
firm and is almost singularly responsible for sales,
margins, profits, and earnings. This pressure to deliver the financial bottom-line on a quarterly basis is particularly acute for marketing functions of
publicly traded firms (Trostel and Nichols, 1982).
Second, marketing is a considerable cost center for
the firm. With product development, promotion,
and distribution expenses amounting to a large
proportion of the annual budgets, marketing instantly attracts top-management attention (Srivastava et al., 1998). Finally, decisions taken by a firm’s
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marketing team have strong ramifications for the
firm’s future. Decisions on branding, positioning,
and public relations directly impact the firm’s corporate reputation and competitive advantage. Topmanagement teams, therefore, feel the need to actively control the marketing function.
Top management’s choice of a mechanism to
control the marketing function is largely dependent on the firm’s corporate goals, its structural
configuration, and its market conditions. By and
large, control mechanisms come in two hues: (1)
control of marketing outputs, and (2) control of
marketing personnel and processes (Jaworski,
1988). Where the former (known as output control) focuses on controlling the specific outcomes
of marketing activities, the latter (referred to as
process control) is meant to control the processes,
actions, and capabilities of marketing individuals
(Challagalla and Shervani, 1996; Jaworski, 1988;
Ramaswami, 1996). We propose that each of the
two types of control mechanisms has a noteworthy and distinctive impact on anomie in the marketing function.
Output control
Output control is, by and large, operationalized
by setting a performance standard (e.g., target market share), evaluating the results (e.g., achieved
market share) against the standard, and taking corrective action in the event of a discrepancy between
the two (Jaworski, 1988). Since marketing outcomes
are crucial to the financial survival of the firm, controlling the output of the marketing function is
deemed critical by top management (Kumar, 2004).
Consequently, strong emphasis is placed on strict
outcome measures, such as market share, profits,
margins, inventory levels, brand equity, customer
lifetime value, and other financial assessments of
marketing productivity. Additionally, scholars also
highlight that intermediate non-financial outcomes
such as customer attitudes and satisfaction deserve
constant attention as well (Rust et al., 2004).
Given the enhanced focus on marketing’s accountability, top management is prone to use output control of marketing productivity as a mechanism to manage the marketing function; research
in the sales context shows that output control is
known to enable clear goal setting and explicit
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performance standards, which minimize the adverse effects of role conflict and role ambiguity
(Ramaswami, 1996). However, output control, if
used predominantly, does not involve the specification of procedures that the marketing function
should follow to reach the financial or non-financial goals or objectives. Consequently, marketing
managers are left with considerable strategic and
operational freedom to pursue the paths to reach
their goals.
The combination of high-pressure bottom-line
management and operational freedom can have
dysfunctional consequences for the environment
of the marketing function. For instance, scholars have noted that the predominant use of output control by the top management can lead to
increased dysfunctional behavior by the marketing team (Jaworski, 1988). The dysfunctional behaviors include: gaming (i.e., behavior that looks
good in terms of control system metrics but is otherwise dysfunctional for the firm, e.g., re-defining the product-market space to show a high market share), smoothing (i.e., data manipulation to
provide a consistent pattern of information such
as sales figures, costs etc.), focusing (e.g., data manipulation to enhance or degrade specific control
information, such as branch office performance),
and invalid reporting (i.e., intentionally presenting
inaccurate information, such as budget overestimates) (Jaworski, 1988). One of the key reasons
for such dysfunction under output control is that,
where on the one hand the top management insists on performance accountability, on the other
it leaves the choices of marketing activities, processes, and decisions almost entirely to the marketing team. Consequently, the marketing team
may potentially follow the most efficient paths
toward goal attainment rather than utilize normative means. Similar evidence has been found
in the context of opportunistic behavior of salespeople. Salespeople under output control have
been found to engage in opportunistic behaviors
to construe a positive impression on their supervisors (Ramaswami, 2002). As was noted by our
respondents:
Our incentives [are] very individual based .... If
you could break a rule and you get something
done and you don’t get caught for it, you’re going to get the benefit of it. If you don’t break the
rule and you don’t get something accomplished,
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you’re going to pay for it .… you won’t advance
as quickly .…
–Brand Manager, Consumer Packaged Goods
And if a salesman thinks he has no chance of
making this quarter, he will hold sales until
next quarter when he might think he has a better chance ... that’s absolutely a pervasive industry practice.
–Brand Manager, Pharmaceuticals

While output control, used predominantly, does
provide key goalposts for the marketing function,
it often leaves the choice of the means to the marketing team. According to anomie theory, as cultural goals within a social system are prioritized
over the means to attain those goals, there is potential for a disjuncture or an imbalance to occur
within the social system. This imbalance is created
when the drive to reach the goals creates a disregard for or diminishes the belief to follow the normative means to reach them. When a disjuncture
between the cultural goals and means occurs, we
would expect a greater propensity toward anomie
(Cohen, 1995). Therefore, we propose:
P2a: A positive relationship exists between the
level of output control used in managing the
marketing function and the level of anomie
within the marketing department.
The impact of output control on anomie can be
more pronounced under certain conditions. We
identify these contingency variables as (a) resource
scarcity, and (b) power of the marketing function,
and develop propositions about each variable’s
role in moderating the effects of output control on
anomie.
Output control and resource scarcity
The marketing function is resource intensive
and frequently demands organizational resources.
Since the costs associated with marketing activities constitute a large portion of a firm’s financial outlay, increasingly marketing functions face
greater accountability for resources expended in
any given financial year (Srivastava et al., 1998). A
key reason for this is the time lag between most
marketing expenditures and the relative payoffs from the investment. For instance, advertis-
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ing and other branding exercises deplete a firm’s
working capital in the short term and may not
deliver expected rewards (such as sales, market
share, or brand image) until much later. Therefore, a firm routinely faces trade-offs in deciding
how much of its resources should be deployed to
marketing activities. Sometimes, the firm’s priorities, strategies, and environmental dynamics may
necessitate that organizational resources, normally devoted to the marketing function, may be
reduced or even withheld. For instance, to offset
higher-than-expected commodity input costs, the
firm may reduce the marketing function’s advertising and promotion budget. Or as our respondents noted:
… if you have more resources, usually you can
get more stuff done, so you don’t have to always cut the corners…
–Brand Manager, Consumer Packaged Goods
… they’ll [marketing personnel] tell you because
they don’t have the [resources], that they’re just
doing whatever it takes, and they’re not going to worry about [certain] ethical issue(s)
… they always have [the excuse] in their back
pocket, ‘well, it’s because I don’t have enough
resources’, or ‘ I don’t have enough staff, so I’m
just gonna do it, and then they [marketing management] can’t get mad at me’
–Regional Marketing Director, Healthcare

Under such a condition of resource scarcity, the
marketing function may find itself facing dual challenges—high expectations to meet the goals inherent in the firm’s output control system and institutional constraints that hinder the means to reach
those goals. The constraint on resources combined
with a greater emphasis on efficiently reaching the
expected goals may propel the function’s dismissal
of normative means. Consequently, marketing executives are likely to feel encouraged to reach their
goals through any means possible, leaving a larger
door open for anomic conditions to prevail. Thus,
we propose:
P2b: As the resources allocated for marketing in
the firm go down, the greater is the impact
of output control on anomie in the marketing
function.
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Output control and power of the marketing function
We propose that the relative power of the marketing function in the organization moderates the
impact of output control on anomie. Since an organization is a coalition of competing interests
(Anderson, 1982), power of the marketing function is defined as the relative amount of influence
that the functional group can exercise over strategic issues in the firm during a specified time period (Workman et al., 1998). Power of the marketing function depends on a number of things:
centrality (how central and essential are marketing activities to the organization), uncertainty
coping (to what extent can marketing buffer the
organization by coping with uncertainty), substitutability (how non-substitutable are marketing activities to the firm), and financial control (to
what extent can marketing control the size and
spending of its budget) (Hickson et al., 1971; Starr
and Bloom, 1994). There is a lot of variation in the
relative power of the marketing function across
different industries and types of firms. For instance, the marketing function has been found to
have limited relevance in technology-driven and
other industrial companies, as opposed to having
higher relevance in consumer goods companies
(Homburg et al., 1999).
Marketing functions that are powerful and influential within their respective firms have more
leverage in terms of the means they can utilize to
reach their goals. If a sub-unit is a powerful constituent in the organization, it is hard to question
the legitimacy of its ways and means. Thus, power
provides the marketing function with more wherewithal and opportunities to dismiss normative
means, and to do as it pleases. Our respondents
confirmed the influence of power toward greater
autonomy of marketing actions:
… the more power that the marketing group
has to make changes, to pursue their short term
targets, the more they’ll [use it]. I don’t think
that the value of the future outweighs, at least
in our structure, the short term value of the cash
bonus.
–Brand Manager, Pharmaceuticals

From the literature and our respondents’ comments, it appears that a powerful, and hence, unrestrained marketing function is more likely to fol-
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low the most efficient paths to reaching its goals,
with a lesser concern for the legality or ethicality of
those paths. Therefore, we conjecture:
P2c: As the power of the marketing function in
the firm increases, the greater is the impact
of output control on anomie in the marketing
function.
Process control
Process control mechanisms refer to the top
management directing both the activities and capabilities of the marketing team. Supportive evidence for process control has also been found in
the context of ethical behavior of salespeople. Research in the sales context indicates that control
systems do have an impact on ethical decision
making (Verbeke et al., 1996) and that salesforce
operating under process control behave more ethically than those under output control (Robertson
and Anderson, 1993; Roma´n and Munuera, 2005).
Further, research on salesforce supervision suggests that process control not only leads to salespeople being more competent, committed, and
motivated, but also helps foster an organizational
culture that promotes deontologically ethical behavior (Hunt and Vasquez-Parraga, 1993). Overall, one can expect similar responses to process
control in the departmental context of marketing
function.
Since process control is directed at both activities and capabilities of the personnel involved, the
marketing team is better prepared to handle market pressure than it can under output control. The
market pressure on the marketing function can
come from numerous constituents. The pressure
could stem from competition, changing trends in
the marketplace, investors and analysts (for publicly traded firms), regulating agencies, suppliers,
or retailers. Under pressure, the marketing function is likely to respond positively to this participatory form of control, wherein the top management
provides procedural guidance and psychological
support (Ramaswami, 1996).
Scholars have also recommended that the effects
of process control be examined distinctly in terms
of controlling activities and capabilities, instead of
restricting it to a single construct (Challagalla and
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Shervani, 1996; Kohli et al., 1998). We, therefore, analyze and discuss how the control of marketing activities and marketing capabilities by the top management can each have a distinctive impact on the
anomie in the marketing function.
Control of marketing activities
Control of marketing activities guides the marketing team by specifying the procedures that
ought to be adopted for performing specific tasks
(Jaeger and Baliga, 1985; Ramaswami, 1996). The
prerequisites to the effective implementation of activity control include clearly defined procedures
for the marketing processes and a strict adherence
to those procedures (Ramaswami, 1996). For instance, top management may exercise activity control with the marketing function by setting procedures for boundary-spanning interactions (such as
initiating business relationships with new clients),
procedures for gathering and disseminating market research information, procedures for maintaining confidentiality of research participants, etc. Directing such activities would involve monitoring
actual behaviors and rewarding (or punishing) performance of specified actions.
The assumption for activity control is that, based
on past performance, if the prescribed procedures
are followed correctly, the outcome should naturally follow. In the absence of an expected outcome,
either more guidance is given or the procedures are
adjusted accordingly (Anderson and Oliver, 1987).
Thus by outlining the rules, boundaries, and procedures of the game, top management can reduce
anxiety for the marketing team and have a positive
impact on the environment of the marketing function, thereby reducing anomie. The respondents in
our qualitative research affirmed the value of clear
procedures and processes:
I think that definitely very formal processes,
where you have written statements to data integrity, or, client privacy or customer privacy,
[are] standards that [marketers will] adhere to.
–Marketing Manager, Marketing Research

We conjecture, however, that activity control reduces anomie in the marketing function only up
to a point, beyond which more of activity control
could in fact exacerbate anomie. Research on sales
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supervision suggests that under constant activity
evaluation, employees could suffer a loss of selfdetermination and feel negative (Challagalla and
Shervani, 1996). Our exploratory research also indicated a similar diminishing effect of activity control on anomie:
And so, I would copy [the supervisor] on
emails, or I’d [relay] I just got off the phone
with so and so, and this is what we talked
about. Because those just made him feel like he
was plugged in. It was ... a quantity issue, more
than a quality issue. [After awhile] I made decisions … just to [upset him] … I was tempted
to make decisions I wouldn’t normally make. I
was much more willing to bend some rules just
to [upset] him.
–Marketing Manager, Marketing Research

Consequently, we propose that process control of marketing activities is likely to have a Ushaped relationship with anomie in the marketing
function.
P3a: A U-shaped relationship exists between process control of marketing activities and anomie in the marketing function.
Control of marketing capabilities
Capabilities are essentially stable patterns of collective activities that allow firms to transform resource inputs effectively into superior value propositions (e.g., Zollo and Winter, 2002). Directing
capabilities involves aiding the development of
skills and abilities required for specified behavior (Challagalla and Shervani, 1996). Scholars have
identified eight marketing capabilities specific to
utilizing the classic marketing mix: product development, pricing, channel management, marketing communications, selling, market information
management, marketing planning, and marketing
implementation (Vorhies and Morgan, 2005). Top
management can aid the development of these capabilities through periodic evaluations of skills,
setting goals and objectives for skills and abilities,
providing guidance and training for improving
abilities, and rewarding (or punishing) for skill enhancement (or lack thereof) (Challagalla and Shervani, 1996).
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Using the anomie lens, we would expect that
process control of capabilities influences the cultural structure of a social system. As the social
system places greater emphasis on normative
means and unambiguous procedures to attain cultural goals, enhanced capabilities to reach those
goals raise the potential for goals-means congruence within the cultural structure of the social
system. A greater emphasis on building capabilities through process control is likely to (a) enhance self-confidence and self-efficacy of marketing executives to meet or exceed corporate goals,
(b) satisfy a marketing executive’s intrinsic need
for self-development as a professional (Challagalla and Shervani, 1996) and imbue skills that are
transportable to other ventures should the executive decide to leave, (c) provide moral and developmental support to the marketing team, indicating the top management’s care and concern about
individual development, as was pointed out by
one of our respondents:
And I’ve, I’ve watched this trend happen, in
that if I focus on a [marketing unit] and their
needs … they see that you’re overseeing them
and so they want to strive to do well, and do the
right thing
–Regional Marketing Director, Healthcare

Overall, process control of capabilities has the potential to balance the outcome expectations with
the psychological and intellectual means to reach
those goals, thereby reducing the likelihood of anomie to occur. Thus, we propose:
P3b: An inverse relationship exists between the
level of process control used in managing
marketing capabilities and the level of anomie
in the marketing function.
Process control and ethics codification
We propose that codification of ethics in the
marketing function moderates the impact of process control on anomie. Codification of ethics implies that there are clear guidelines, specific to the
marketing function, on what are considered moral,
ethical, and acceptable marketing practices and
what are not. Scholars agree that although there
is no clear consensus on what is ethical and what
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is not ethical in marketing practice (Robin and
Reidenbach, 1987), marketing functions can be
broadly categorized into those that codify their ethics and those that do not. Since sensitivity to ethics requires that marketing functions act out with
carefully thought out rules of moral philosophy,
marketing functions that do not codify their ethical guidelines are likely to be inconsistent in their
ethical decision making. Codification brings consistency and unswerving guidelines that positively
impact the environment of the marketing function by reducing ambiguity. Our respondents also
noted that codification provides a common framework to guide behavior and provides a lens to mitigate disagreements:
I think it would keep people focused, on the ultimate end goal. It’s really easy to get into the
numbers game and the money games. But I
think if we sit down and really think about our
code of ethics … that keeps you focused on
more than the money.
–Marketing Consultant, Software and
E-Commerce
Because, whereas I am a very ethical marketing
director, the next person may not be. And so, [a
marketing code of ethics] would be the company’s way of stating this is what’s important and
valuable to us.
–Marketing Manager, Marketing Research

Using process control of both activities and capabilities for a marketing function that has high codification of ethics brings a synergy of dual forces
that is likely to reduce anomie. A predominant focus on process control of marketing activities and
capabilities creates a climate in which methods,
procedures, and skills are emphasized as the primary drivers of firm success (Ramaswami, 1996).
If this focus is coupled with a codified set of rules,
then it is likely to lead to marketing decisions and
actions that emphasize the appropriate means to
achieve desired ends, rather than the ends themselves (Jaworski, 1988). In sociological terms, the
greater the clarity regarding the normative means
to attain cultural goals, the lesser the likelihood of
incongruence between goals and means. Anomie is
predicted to arise in social systems where the ethical codes are worded vaguely so that ethical transgressions are not looked upon as violations (Cohen,
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1993). If the ethical codes in the marketing function
are worded imprecisely and loosely, it communicates to the marketing team that the top management is not serious about ramifications of ethically
questionable behavior (Cohen, 1993). Hence, we
posit:
P3c: The greater the codification of ethics in the
marketing function, the higher the impact of
process control (of activities and capabilities)
in reducing anomie in the marketing function.
Discussion
The marketing function is often associated with
unethical practices, given the exposure to environmental pressures inherent in its boundary-spanning role. While an array of theoretical frameworks
addressing marketing ethical issues have been presented in the literature, scholars have called for
further understanding of organizational levers that
management can use to attenuate unethical practices. Heeding the call, we examine the inter-relationships between three sets of organizational factors—the environment of the marketing function,
top management’s control mechanisms, and contingency factors in the marketing function such
as resource scarcity, power, and ethics codification—that impact ethical decision making. We argue that by understanding the sense of normlessness in the environment of the marketing function,
through the theoretical notion of anomie (Merton,
1964, 1968), we can predict the propensity of unethical marketing practices to occur. We develop a
conceptual model focusing on anomie in the marketing function, and argue how output and process control mechanisms employed by top management can have distinctive impacts on the extent
of anomie. Additionally, we propose the moderating effects of three contingency variables—resource scarcity, power, and ethics codification—on
the relationship between control mechanisms and
anomie in the marketing function. Our conceptualization delivers a number of theoretical and managerial implications, to which we now turn.
Theoretical implications
We utilize the theoretical notion of anomie to illuminate conditions in the marketing function that
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encourage unethical marketing practices. While
scholars have broadly addressed the role of anomie in ethics and in business crime (Cohen, 1993,
1995; Rosenbaum and Kuntze, 2003), we take it a
step further and argue for: (a) the applicability of
anomie in the context of marketing functions, (b)
explicit linkages between structural factors, such as
control mechanisms, and anomie in the marketing
function, and (c) conditions in the marketing function such as resource scarcity, power, and ethics
codification that impact the level of anomie. Our
conceptualization lays the groundwork for investigating other organizational factors, such as leadership style or strategic orientations, which could impact anomie.
This conceptualization is also distinctive, in that
we use a structural-level, sociological framework in
Merton’s (1968) theory of anomie. As noted earlier,
prior studies have conducted examinations at the
individual level (Caruana et al., 2001; Rosenbaum
and Kuntze, 2003; Tsahuridu, 2006) and based their
inquiries on psychological frameworks. In contrast,
our examination is focused on the departmental milieu of the marketing function. This context
also delineates our study from previous work that
had studied anomie in settings such as retail businesses, undergraduate business schools, and workplaces in general (Caruana et al., 2000, 2001; Tsahuridu, 2006).
We also extend the body of theoretical literature on control mechanisms. Existing research on
control mechanisms examines various approaches
to set, monitor, and evaluate performance against
a standard (Jaworski, 1988). We augment the research on control mechanisms by theorizing the
unintended consequences of using output and process control. Although researchers in the past have
evaluated the general dysfunctional consequences
of using predominantly output control (Jaworski,
1988), control mechanisms have not been explicitly
linked to the environment of the marketing function. We theorize that when top management picks
output versus process control, it ends up creating
very different structural conditions that have dissimilar impacts on the environment of the marketing function. Specifically, the predominant use of
output control can create conditions that propagate
anomie, and hence unethical marketing practices.
Thus, we bring into focus the unintended effects of
control mechanisms.
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Future research directions
The body of literature on anomie and control
mechanisms would benefit from an empirical test
of our conceptual framework. We recommend
testing our proposed conceptual model through
a cross-sectional survey with dual respondents
(marketing managers and top management) in industries that are characterized with high competitive intensity and risk taking (such as those in
SIC codes 35 and 36) as these are laden with internal and external pressures on the marketing team.
Where questions dealing with the marketing
function (i.e., anomie, power, resources, codification) should be addressed to the marketing managers, questions on control mechanisms should
be directed at the top management of the company. A number of our constructs have a history
of measures in the literature: Both Challagalla and
Shervani (1996) and Ramaswami (1996) outline
measures of output control and process control;
similarly researchers have addressed power and
influence of the marketing function (Homburg et
al., 1999; Starr and Bloom, 1994). New measures
can be developed for resource scarcity and codification of ethics based on theoretical literature.
Scales capturing anomie from past research (Menard, 1995; Tsahuridu, 2006) can also be adapted to
construct an anomie scale for our context. The following firm characteristics should be controlled
for when testing our model: firm size, firm age,
industry type, and level of competitive intensity
in the industry.
Managerial implications
Corporate managements, by and large, are aware
of the fact that a large number of ethical problems
in business arise in marketing, particularly in the
buyer/ seller dyad (Vitell, 2003). Given the increasing popularity of outsourcing, the number of
business networks and alliances between marketers and their constituents is only likely to further
increase. While these new interactions create dynamic new roles and relationships for marketers,
they also heighten the potential for ethical pitfalls.
To either reduce or eliminate ethical transgressions
by the marketing team, both the top management
and marketing executives need to be aware of the
organizational conditions that encourage unethical
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practices. Our model provides multiple directions
to managers wanting to get a grip on such underlying factors.
First, top management needs to be cognizant of
the unintended consequences of using output versus process control to manage the marketing function. The impact of a particular control mechanism
extends beyond just governance and supervision.
Control mechanisms signal expectations, explicitly or implicitly approve of goals and procedures,
shape the environment of the marketing function,
and thus lay the groundwork for ethical or unethical practices to follow. When top management predominantly employs output control mechanisms,
it puts an emphasis on bottom-line objectives. This
leads to the marketing function’s environment being characterized by the management’s constant
focus, monitoring, and evaluation of prized organizational outcomes. Such an environment is likely
to be marked by many demands on the marketing
function, such as weekly sales forecasts demanded
by top management, frequent calls for forecast revisions regardless of the availability of any new
data or market insight, and frequent submission of
action plans for cutting marketing costs. To operate
and be rewarded in this environment, marketing
executives must singularly focus on efficient goal
achievement. This may often involve incrementally
disregarding normative procedures. From innocuously over-forecasting expenses in the marketing
budget (e.g., as a contingency to meet profit goals)
to inflating projected sales of a new product to ensure capital investment, even the most conscientious marketer faces a war of attrition within this
environment. Ultimately, an environmental imbalance is created within the marketing function and
it claims its share of ethical casualties.
Second, the use of process control mechanisms
paired with a code of marketing ethics provides
proactive safeguards against unethical marketing
practices. By prescribing, monitoring, and evaluating marketing processes; and developing a code of
ethics specific to marketing, top management can
take the ambiguity out of the environment of the
marketing function. We acknowledge that firms
may employ a combination or hybrid of the two
control mechanisms. However, our aim here is to
stress the need to identify the managerial levers
that promote a balanced marketing environment.
Having a code of ethics specific to the marketing
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function, along with routine monitoring of the environment, would serve as valuable inputs for
managerial decision making regardless of the control mechanism(s) employed.
Finally, both the top management and marketing managers need to be sensitive to environmental conditions that are symptomatic of anomie.
Typical individual psychological responses to anomie include a sense of futility, alienation, and powerlessness (Cohen, 1993). Managers should be cognizant of such symptoms and realize that unless
structural changes are made, individuals are likely
to feel discouraged and lose their motivation to act
ethically. As we argue, one of the ways to attenuate anomie is to re-visit the control mechanisms in
practice.
Both scholars and practitioners have observed
that marketing as a function is losing its influence
with the top-management teams (Kumar, 2004).
Increasingly, it is more likely to find marketing
functions being controlled by top executives from
other functions, such as finance, who do not share
the same understanding for the processes, pressures, and ethics of marketing. Therefore, it is critical for the top management to understand the consequences of their decisions on how to manage
marketing functions. Top management’s decisionmaking process must include an assessment of the
potential second-order effects of control mechanisms. The firm is best served when equilibrium
exists between the organizationally prized outcomes and the normative means to achieve them.
Note
1. For an exhaustive summary of articles detailing ethics within
specific marketing domains see Tsalikis and Fritzsche (1989).
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